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BY CAPTAIN WALKER D. MILLS, U.S. MARINE 
CORPS, AND ERIK LIMPAECHER 
Bitter experience in war has taught the maxim that 
the art of war is the art of the logistically feasible. 
- Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U.S. Navy 
I n November 1942, the Japanese army on Guadalca-nal was starving to death. Lieutenant General Ha-rukichi Hyakutake reported that his troops were 
living on nothing more than water and grass, with I 00 
dying of starvation each day. 1 By January 1943, it was 
200 per day.~ A brutally honest Japanese lieutenant re-
corded a life expectancy chart in his diary: 
He who can rise to his feet: 30 days left to live 
He who can sit up: 20 days left to live 
He who must urinate while lying down: 3 days left to live 
He who cannot speak: 2 days left to live 
He who cannot blink his eyes: dead at dawn3 
On 7 February, the final remnants of the Imperial 
Japanese 17th Anny were evacuated. Fifteen thousand 
had died from starvation, three times the number lost in 
combat.4 After the war, a Japanese veteran of the fight-
ing and starvation remarked that Guadalcanal is "no 
longer merely a name of an island in Japanese mili-
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' ' 
tary history. It is the name of the graveyard of the Japa-
nese Anny!'' 
The Japanese Anny lost on Guadalcanal because it 
could not reliably supply its forces. Guadalcanal was not 
unique, only the best known example. Imperial Japanese 
garrisons faced starvation across the Pacific. Some even 
resorted to cannibalism as the Allied campaign bypassed 
islands and left them to "wither on the vine.'16 A chronic 
failure to account for logistics and supply expedition-
ary forces with even basic necessities such as food-let 
alone ammunition and other materiel-crippled Japan's 
war effort. 
By 1945, the populace in the Home Islands also faced 
starvation, but in 1942 there was more than enough food 
to supply the soldiers at Guadalcanal and elsewhere; the 
problem was getting it there. The Japanese Navy in 1942 
still was roughly equivalent to the U.S. Navy in combat 
power, and Japan still had a robust mer.chant marine. The 
most important difference between the two navies was 
logistics: Japan could not keep its forces supplied in a 
other nations. Unfortunately, EABO concepts only ex-
acerbate this long-standing problem. Marine and Navy 
leaders and outside agencies have been calling attention 
to it for years. 
... WRONGSIDE 
General Berger underscored in 2019 the need for inno-
vation in expeditionary logistics in the Commandants 
Planning Guidance: 
To succeed in closing the force in any future conflict, we 
must re-imagine our . . • prepositioning, and expeditionary 
logistics so they are more survivable, at less risk of cata-
strophic loss, and agile in their employment.9 
Almost a year later, the Commandant again warned 
that the Corps is not making sufficient progress: 
I am not confident that we have identified the ... logistical 
sustainment needed .... I do not believe our Phase I and II 
efforts gave logistics sufficient attention.'0 
The Navy lacks at every level the logistics forces 
to support a large Pacific campaign, from strategic 
sealift to over-the-beach logistics. 
contested environment. Today, the United States faces 
the same problem. 
RIGHT ANALOGY ... 
Guadalcanal has become popular as a historical analog for 
the Marine Corps' expeditionary advanced base operations 
(EABO) concept as well as the Army's multidomain op-
erations concept.7 According to Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps General David H. Berger, EABO will enable: 
the navel force to persist forward within the arc of adversary 
long-range precision fires to support our treaty partners with 
combat credible forces on e much more resilient and difficult 
to target forward basing infrastructure.' 
Marines will operate in smaller, more widely distrib-
uted groups than ever before and will have to make sub-
stantial investments in new technologies such as autono-
mous vehicles and long-range precision fires. 
The inherent risk in EABO is that traditional mari-
time logistics will be unable to support and sustain these 
groups in the contested environment. U.S. forces may 
not have access to stocks and supplies prepositioned in 
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But much of the conversation around operationaliz-
ing EABO remains focused on fires, not what will be re-
quired to make possible and sustain those fires. Without 
addressing EABO's looming logistical challenges, the 
Marine Corps could well recapitulate the fight for Gua-
dalcanal- but from the Japanese perspective. 
CAPABILITY GAPS 
The Navy lacks at every level the logistics forces to sup-
port a large Pacific campaign, from strategic sealift to 
over-the-beach logistics. Military Sealift Command op-
erates and crews the 125 ships that replenish the Navy 
at sea and transport troops and cargo around the world, 
but it is in dire straits. A recent Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments report concluded: "Absent dra-
matic improvements, U.S. sealift forces would face ma-
jor challenges and may fail to meet Joint Force demands 
in a major war."11 A 2017 Government Accountability 
Office report found similar shortfalls.12 And a recent De-
partment of Defense Inspector General investigation 
found that Military Sealift Command chronically mis-
represented ship readiness-implying that the problems 
watchdogs and analysts identified are even worse than 
reported. 13 
The Navy's fleet of large L-class amphibious ships, 
which are designed to deploy and sustain Marines in 
combat, is chronically understrength; it has been years 
since the Navy purchased enough to meet the Marine 
Corps' stated requirement of 38. In 2019, in the face of 
growing concern that these large, slow, and overt vessels 
would not survive in a peer fight, and with no indica-
tion the Navy would reach the specified number, Gen-
eral Berger dropped it altogether.14 The Marine Corps 
has asked shipbuilders for proposals for a new class of 
smaller, more numerous amphibious ships. However, any 
such ships will probably be a far cry from the "afford-
able and plentiful" platfonns the Commandant has called 
for and would do little to solve the intertheater logistics 
problem.15 
The slate of intratheater and over-the-beach logistics 
also poses an immediate and critical gap for Marines.16 
Fonner Commandant General James F. Amos wrote a 
prescient article in 2013 forecasting a "significant gap in 
the planned surface-connector fleet."17 Today, Marines 
are living with that gap. Marginal improvements over 
legacy designs such as the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 
and "fighting connectors" can help solve the problems as-
sociated with a contested beach landing, but not the prob-
lems associated with a much larger contested region.18 
CLANDESTINE LOGISTICS 
The Navy and Marine Corps need a clandestine logis-
tics capability. Such a capability would allow the United 
States to sustain stand-in forces operating inside an ad-
versary's weapons engagement zone (WEZ) indefinitely. 
The lmperlal Japanese 
Navy's Inability to re-
supply troops on Islands 
Invaded by U.S. forc-
es-or "left to wither on 
the vine" after being by-
passed-led to the starva-
tion of thousands of sol-
diers, some of whom (as 
shown here) were cap-
tured. On Guadalcanal, as 
many as 15,000 Japanese 
starved to death before 
the Island fell. 
Without it, stand-in forces would "wither on the vine," 
much like the Japanese forces spread across the Pacific 
did during World War II. A western Pacific war could be-
come a stalemate-with both sides able to deny use of 
large zones to the other, but neither gaining sea control 
to use the zones itself. Unanned or lightly anned logis-
tics vessels would be easy targets, and China's military 
has made clear those ships will be targeted in a potential 
conftict.19 With tradit_ional logistics shut out, only clan-
destine logistics platfonns will be able to sustain the in-
side forces. 
What would such a capability look like? It would com-
prise platfonns in the air, on the sea, and below the sur-
face. A starting point could be a mix of amphibious air-
craft; small, high-speed utility vessels; and low-profile 
vessels. None of these are completely clandestine, but all 
have reduced observability compared to comparable tra-
ditional platfonns. New types of fuel could offer fflll ad-
vantages-they are safer to transport and store than fos-
sil fuels and reduce the infrared and exhaust signatures of 
combustion engines. Working together in operationally 
relevant numbers. this platform mix can change the lo-
gistics paradigm. 
AMPHIBIOUS AIRCRAFT 
Amphibious aircraft are only a few years younger than 
aircraft themselves-the first was flown in 1911, only 
eight years after the Wright Brothers' first flight.20 What 
makes amphibious aircraft unique is their ability to land 
either on conventional runways or on water-lagoons, 
rivers, lakes, bays, or even the open ocean. 
They are large enough to carry passengers and cargo 
long distances and deliver them to areas that do not have 
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Bulk fuel ts the llfeblood of modern military operations. But 
stored In giant bladders, such as these set up at Camp Pendleton, 
Callfornla, they are a significant vulnerability. The Marine Corps 
needs new fuels with higher energy densities, lower risk of detec-
tion, and easier transportability. 
developed aviation inftastructure. The Consolidated PBY 
Catalina and the Grumman Albatross are two of the best-
known historical examples. Catalinas served across the 
Pacific in World War ll and were produced by the thou-
sands for transport. reconnaissance, strike, and search-
and-rescue roles. The Albatross served in the Navy un-
til the J 970s. in the Coast Guard into the 1980s. and in 
international service through the 1990s as an antisubma-
rine warfare platfonn. Today, both Russia and China arc 
investing in amphibious aircraft. China's new AG600 is 
roughly the size of a Boeing 737 and boasts a range of 
2,800 miles.21 Japan's US-2 amphibious aircraft. with an 
operational range of2,900 miles, is ideal for operating in 
the west.em Pacific. 
Amphibious aircraft are not necessarily clandestine, 
but because they are not tethered to fixed runways and 
related infrastructure, they can be tactically and opera-
tionally unpredictable and therefore much more difficult 
for an enemy to target than land- or even carrier-based 
aircraft. Traditional intertheater assets such as the C-J 7 
Globemaster are tethered to runways that can easily be 
targeted at long range. Helicopters, while much more 
versatile, lack the range to cover the Jong distances in the 
Pacific without air-to-air refueling. 
SMALL BOATS 
Small, fast boats capable of serving in a utility role are in-
valuable. Their size and cost are typically proportional; 
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their low cost makes them inherently more risk worthy 
than larger ships, while their small size protects them by 
hiding them in littoral and wave clutter. High speed helps 
protect them in an engagement. The Navy's Mk VI patrol 
boat, the Swedish CB90, or even the Coast Guard's fast re-
sponse cutters could provide ready models for a fast util-
ity boat. The Marine Corps and Navy also are experiment-
ing with small unmanned surface vessels, which could be 
ideal for resupply missions.22 Small boats are also valuable 
in roles such as maritime reconnaissance and strike. 
While small boats do not have the canying capacity 
of huger ships, they can link fleet logistics ships padced 
safely outside the WE2 with stand-in forces. The Whid-
bey Island-class amphibious ships can comfortably hold 
eight Mk VI boats in their well decks. Narcotics traffick-
ers in the Caribbean often transfer illicit cargos between 
"go-fast" boats as part of a high-speed shell game that 
could be a model for resilient Navy-Marine Corps logis-
tics for the Pacific. 
LOW-PROFILE VESSELS 
Low-profile vessels (LPVs) are the third unique capabil-
ity ideally suited for clandestine logistics. Again, narcot-
ics smugglers offer a possible model; LPVs from the Ca-
ribbean and eastern Pacific have been intercepted as far 
away as the coast ofSpain.23 LPVs operate almost totally 
submerged, with only a small snorkel and cockpit visi-
ble above the surface. Inside they carry a few crew mem-
bers and several tons of cargo. And LPVs are growing in 
size-the Colombian military recently captured possibly 
the largest built to date, with a potential cargo capacity of 
more than eight tons.24 Even after at least three decades 
of use, they remain difficult to detect and intercept- just 
ask the Coast Guard. 
With mild improvements, these vessels could carry 
tens of tons of cargo thousands of miles between safe 
logistics hubs and stand-in forces in the Pacific, and 
they are excellent candidates to be unmanned systems. 
These vessels would travel slowly but would be almost 
invisible while transiting from safe logistics hubs in 
Guam or Australia to Marine Corps forces deep in-
side the WEZ, delivering food, munitions, or other vi-
tal warfighting material to keep expeditionary forces 
in the fighL 
LOW-SIGNATURE FUELS 
The logistics chain that supplies bulk fuel to forward 
units is often highly visible, taking the form of vulner-
able oilers and fuel truck convoys. In Iraq and Afghani-
stan, where U.S. forces used as much as 22 gallons of fuel 
per soldier per day, a disproportionate number of U.S. 
casualties came from fuel convoys.25 Engineers at Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory 
(where one author works) and elsewhere have demon-
strated that novel nonliquid fuels such as specially treated 
aluminum can help reduce expeditionary forces' danger-
ous dependence on petroleum. 26 
Aluminum has almost double the energy density of 
diesel fuel and presents none of the fire hazards during 
transporL Aluminum can even be sourced locally from 
trash and recycled materials-hidden in plain sight, in 
other words. When activated for fuel, it produces hydro-
gen, which in an efficient fuel cell generates a lower ther-
mal signature than combustion engines and none of the 
visible exhaust, only water. Shifting from liquid fossil 
fuels to inert solid fuels and hydrogen fuel cells would 
dramatically reduce the logistics needs of expeditionary 
forces-and the need to send wlnerable oilers across the 
open ocean. 
TOWARD A RESILIENT FUTURE 
The Navy and Marine Corps need to develop a resilient 
logistics capability that will enable them to sustain ex-
peditionary forces forward in contested environments. 
Naval theorist and Proceedings author Milan Vego has 
argued that the outcome on Guadalcanal depended on 
who could better control the sea to " supply and reinforce 
ground troops contending ashore fur mastery."27 
If the Department of Defense does not experiment with 
new technology and concepts in naval logistics, Marines 
and sailors operating ashore could face a fate similar to 
the Imperial Japanese forces in World War II. The most 
effective way to do this is through a variety of comple-
mentary platforms that can be clandestine and operation-
ally unp~ctabte and fueled by more readily sourced, 
safer, lower-signature, easily hidden, nonpetroleum 
fuel. Together, these kinds of platforms will ensure that 
no Marine Corps officer will ever keep a grim table of 
starvation like the one kept by a Japanese lieutenant on 
GuadaJcanal. 
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